Making borders from below: the emergence of the Turkish–Iraqi Frontier, 1918–1925 by Tejel Gorgas, Jordi
Making borders from below: the emergence of the Turkish–
Iraqi Frontier, 1918–1925
Jordi Tejel Gorgas
Department of History, University of Neucha^tel, Neucha^tel, Switzerland
Although the First World War formally ended in 1918, the Great War left behind several 
zones of post-war violence, as the disappearance of imperial borders – from Eastern 
Europe to the Caucasus and the Middle East – created spaces without order or a deﬁnite 
state authority.1 Among these ‘shatter zones’,2 the provisional frontier between Turkey 
and Iraq holds an important place in the interwar period, for the resolution of this border 
dispute was delayed several times as a result of unabated collusion involving a variety of 
state, transnational and local actors. In that sense, while high-level diplomatic negotiations 
and intense debates on the fate of this post-Ottoman territory took place in corridors, ofﬁ-
ces and assembly rooms in distant cities such as Paris, Lausanne, Geneva, Cairo, London 
and Ankara, this article will show how and to what extent local actors, particularly border-
landers, played a role in the resolution of the Turkish–Iraqi Frontier dispute.
After addressing very brieﬂy the claims and counter-claims raised by Great Britain and 
Turkey with regard to the provisional frontier and the strongly related ‘Mosul Affair’, this 
article will turn its attention to the discourses, strategies and attitudes of local border-
landers between 1918 and 1925. Taking its cue from an invigorating scholarship on bor-
derlands which pays attention to the agency of local players in the border-making 
processes,3 the article posits that, as the region became a battleground for British and 
Turkish agents seeking to secure the loyalty of local community leaders, the latter played 
a relevant role in two fundamental and complementary ways.
First, by adopting an anti-imperialist rhetoric coloured by different inﬂuences – Muslim 
solidarity and Kurdish nationalism – local leaders, alongside transnational actors embed-
ded within the League of Nations, forced Britain and Turkey to acknowledge the ‘just’ 
claims of the Kurds who were seeking the award of special rights. Indeed, the protection 
of ‘minorities’ was essential for justifying the British mandate over Iraq at the international 
level. In that sense, Britain vowed to fulﬁl the ‘unanimous’ aspirations among Kurdish pop-
ulations for local autonomy based on respecting the right to self-determination. Turkey, 
on the other hand, rejected old imperialist policies and presented itself as the sole guaran-
tor of local aspirations due to the historical bonds (political, religious and social) between 
the Mosul Vilayet and Anatolia. In doing so, Turkey hinted in a sense at its willingness to 
acknowledge Kurdish particularism under the umbrella of a Sunni Muslim government.4
Throughout the Frontier dispute, borderland representatives advanced different claims 
and aspirations depending on the context and the targeted audience, thereby allowing
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them to play off Turkish and British agents against each other, and ultimately, to gain bro-
kerage. Crucially, borderlanders did not constitute a homogenous group but rather an 
assemblage of individuals with different and sometimes conﬂicting personalities, interests 
and ambitions. Whether they were opportunistic or full-hearted anti-imperialists or both, 
local actors, through their shifting alliances, obliged both Britain and Turkey to readjust 
their claims over Mosul in an equally strategic fashion.
Second, and related to the previous point, the article will argue that borderlanders 
pushed British and Turkish authorities to the conclusion that an international agreement 
on the border issue was the best solution for both parties. Neither the Turks nor the British 
were capable of coping with local revolts and changing strategies across a restless, mov-
ing frontier. Although the detailed boundary delimitation was the result of diplomatic 
negotiations,5 the process through which Turkey and Great Britain came to abide by the 
Brussels line cannot be fully apprehended without taking into account the interactions 
between local players and a variety of both state and non-state actors.
While I do not dismiss the centrality of diplomacy and high-level geostrategic dynamics 
in the resolution of international conﬂicts, I argue for the necessity of linking different 
scales of analysis – namely, macro and micro – and histories – international, global, and 
local – to better apprehend the emergence of the modern Middle East in the interwar 
period.
Challenging post-war settlements
The British occupied the former Ottoman Mosul vilayet in early November 1918, a couple 
of days after the armistice was signed between the Ottoman government and the Allied 
forces. Yet, much like elsewhere in Europe, the ﬁghting did not stop altogether.6 In the 
ﬁrst half of 1919, British and French forces occupied Istanbul, while Greeks and Italian 
forces landed on the Aegean coast. Under such conditions, the sultan’s government in 
Istanbul agreed to the signing of the Treaty of Sevres on 10 August 1920.
The treaty adopted the Wilsonian programme – including the right of self-determina-
tion for non-Turkish ‘nationalities’ under Ottoman rule – to Allied forces’ advantage, 
thereby projecting the formation of both an Armenian and a Kurdish state in Eastern 
Anatolia (art. 62). In addition, the Kurdish districts of Mosul vilayet were to be permitted to 
join this autonomous state, if they wished to do so upon a series of conditions (art. 64).7
The mandate for Iraq was subsequently awarded to Great Britain in 1920, while the politi-
cal status of Mosul province was left open for negotiations between the Turkish and 
British governments.
However, the resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal rejected the treaty alto-
gether, and carried out a successful struggle that mixed means of paramilitary and con-
ventional warfare, coupled with an effective strategy of establishing alliances with tribes 
and employing the discourse of Muslim anti-imperialism. While these former Ottoman 
ofﬁcers obtained a series of signiﬁcant military victories in the Caucasus and South-eastern 
Anatolia, the resistance movement made its territorial ambitions clear through what was 
called the Misak-ı Milli (the National Pact) which laid claim over Mosul vilayet as well as 
the region of Aleppo and other parts of Syria.8
Thereafter, the ‘Mosul Affair’ gave rise to intense debates at the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, which had proclaimed itself as the new legitimate government in the country.
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Mustafa Kemal, for instance, stated that Turkey would never compromise over the issue of
the Mosul vilayet9 and diverse deputies highlighted that Mosul province was a part of the
motherland, thereby encouraging the new Turkish authorities to accomplish the principles
of the National Pact: ‘Raise our ﬂag on the frontier of Mosul, and put it like bayonets on the
British ﬂag and into their throat!’10 Tension in the Grand National Assembly increased to
the point where moderate deputies were sidelined after the resignation in June 1921 of
Foreign Minister Bakir Sami, who was deemed to be favourable to the settlement of the
‘Mosul Affair’ through diplomatic negotiations.
A few months later in October 1921, Ankara gained the upper hand in the dispute
when the Treaty of Ankara ended the hostilities between France and Turkey, thereby fur-
ther isolating Great Britain.11 In addition, Mustafa Kemal and his followers were actively
seeking to destabilize the region by encouraging anti-British tribal unrest in Mesopota-
mia.12 Such developments and manoeuvres, combined with increasing concern over the
ﬁnancial costs of the Mandate led British ofﬁcials in London to progressively agree with
the ofﬁcials in Baghdad who argued that stability could be achieved only through the
inclusion of Kurdish districts in Iraq.
This was in line with the British policy that was largely spelled out at the Cairo Confer-
ence in March 1921. The main object of the conference was ‘to maintain ﬁrm British con-
trol as cheaply as possible’.13 In that sense, the Royal Air Force was to play a central role in
the maintenance of order in Iraq. Besides, Faysal’s candidature to the kingdom of Iraq,
together with the fate of the Kurdish-majority districts, was also widely discussed.14 In the
face of Turkish threat and in order to secure Iraq’s frontier against Turkish claims, some
concrete measures were necessary:
On the one hand, the British fostered Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq in order to counter
Turkey’s pan-Islamic appeals to the Kurdish population. On the other hand, however, the
British government attempted to reconcile the aspirations of Kurdish nationalists with the
objectives of British policy in Iraq: the consolidation of King Faisal’s government in Baghdad,
and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Iraq so that it would become a viable
state.15
The second step was thus taken at the Lausanne Peace Conference, which began on 20
November 1922. Yet it was clear from the onset that Turkish and British positions were
irreconcilable. The Turkish view on Mosul vilayet advanced several ethnic, economic and
legal arguments: (1) Turks and Kurds – racially inseparable – were a majority in the prov-
ince; (2) local populations had been economically oriented towards Anatolia for centuries;
(3) the occupation of the vilayet after the armistice was illegal; (4) the province’s inhabi-
tants wanted to live with their peers in Anatolia. The British position claimed quite the
contrary: (1) the Kurds were racially different from the Turks;16 (2) most local trade was
with the rest of Iraq; (3) legally, the British government had been entrusted with the man-
date over Iraq by the League of Nations; (4) frequent Kurdish revolts ﬁrst against the
Sultan and then the Ankara government – in particular, the Koc¸gir^ı revolt in Dersim
area – contradicted Turkish claims on Turkish–Kurdish brotherhood.17
Against this backdrop, on 4 February 1923, Turkey and the Allied representatives in
Lausanne agreed to exclude temporarily the ‘Mosul Affair’ from the conference agenda.
Notwithstanding the incompatible views on Mosul, different factors helped to unwind
relations between Turkey and Britain. First, the electoral victory of the Conservative Prime
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Minister Andrew Bonar Law in November 1922 opened the door to an appeasement of 
Turkey, particularly as Britain began to show signs of abandoning its previous pro-Greek 
policies and limiting its support to Assyrian and Kurdish claims in northern Iraq. In return 
for these concessions Turkey was asked to join the League of Nations and by doing so 
help Britain and France to further isolate Bolshevik Russia with whom Turkey had con-
structed a working relationship.
The second factor that eased the tensions between Turkey and Britain was the convic-
tion of the Turkish delegate Ismet Pasha that the British would do everything in their 
hands to avoid an open war against Turkey because Britain’s main concern in Iraq was oil, 
not the implementation of the Treaty of Sevres.18 As Peter Sluglett argues, although the 
British had advanced security concerns to justify the establishment of a strategic frontier 
in the mountainous areas between Turkey and Iraq, British and Iraqi policy over Mosul 
vilayet was best seen in terms ﬁrst of ‘the desire to ensure that the oilﬁelds remained on 
the Iraqi side of the de facto frontier, and secondly to maintain the integrity of the Iraqi 
state as British and Iraqi politicians envisaged it in the 1920s’.19
Belligerent discourses were to prevail, though. Ankara renewed anti-British propaganda 
efforts in the Rawanduz area,20 while Turkish deputies in the Grand National Assembly 
persisted in asking Mustafa Kemal to implement the National Pact, including the ‘restora-
tion’ of Mosul vilayet within the Turkish borders, by all means possible. In that sense, Mus-
tafa Durak, a deputy from Erzurum, stated that ‘I can leave the oil of Mosul to them but 
not the Kurds’.21 Furthermore, to some deputies in Ankara, referring the Mosul issue to 
the League of Nations, where London was supposed to be in a strong position, would 
have been the same as giving Mosul to the British. Notwithstanding the dissatisfaction 
among the sceptics, Mustafa Kemal asked the Turkish Assembly to make a choice between 
war and the postponement of the Mosul question. Interestingly, he explained that ‘the 
postponement of this issue did not necessarily mean abandoning the Mosul Vilayet, but 
perhaps only deferring it until Turkey was in a stronger position’.22
Despite the conciliatory moves made simultaneously by London and Ankara, by May 
1924 negotiations proved to be unsuccessful. Subsequently, Turkey and Great Britain 
agreed to send the dispute to the League of Nations, thereby acknowledging that the 
unofﬁcial war carried out by both sides since 1919 was at a deadlock. The issue started to 
be discussed in Geneva on 20 September 1924 where the debates just focused on the 
demarcation of the Turkish–Iraqi border, the so-called ‘Brussels line’.
As expected by sceptical deputies in Ankara and the Turkish press,23 the League even-
tually ceded Mosul vilayet to Mandate Iraq. While British membership of the League of 
Nations and its imperial position in the post-war context may help explain Britain’s diplo-
matic victory in 1925, the following sections will demonstrate that the process through 
which Turkey and Great Britain came to abide by the Brussels line cannot be fully appre-
hended without taking into account the interactions between local players and a variety 
of both state and non-state actors between 1918 and 1925.
First colonial encounters in the border area
The Mosul vilayet, covering the districts of Mosul, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk, had a heteroge-
neous population with Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Jews and Armenians. 
Yet, the Northern section of the province – running between Zakho, Amadiyah, Akra and
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Rawanduz – was essentially inhabited by Assyrians and Kurds. Following the British occu-
pation of different sections of the Mosul vilayet, the consolidation of the armistice frontier
between the Ottoman and British forces became a pressing issue. However, the scarcity of
British soldiers combined with the rugged nature of the region made the military occupa-
tion of the area unlikely. Instead, the British opted for some form of buffer Kurdish state
under a semi-independent ruler.
Accordingly, Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji (1882–1956) was appointed Governor or hukum-
dar of ‘Southern Kurdistan’, the term deﬁning the area between the Great Zab and the
Diyala rivers. For each of the minor sub-divisions, Kurdish ofﬁcials were appointed to work
under the guidance of the British political ofﬁcers. The remaining districts of the Mosul
Vilayet were placed under nominal British control.
British colonial policy also applied to other local communities, particularly the displaced
Assyrian populations (i.e. Nestorians) that originally hailed from Hakkari region but sought
refuge in Iran during the First World War as a result of Ottoman and Kurdish massacres.24
As the Great War entered its ﬁnal phase, a group of Assyrians fought back against the
Ottomans around Urmia along with the British army and a local Armenian force. Yet fol-
lowing their defeat, these regiments together with their families were evacuated under
British protection ﬁrst to Hamadan and then to the Baquba refugee camp, north of
Baghdad.25
The British interest in Assyrians as a potential supplementary force with military aims
did not diminish by the end of the war, however.26 Although some refugee leaders asked
the British to allow them to return to Hakkari, the irresolution of the border dispute as
well as British pressures convinced most of the refugee communities to stay in Iraq
waiting for a ﬁnal settlement of the frontier line. While diaspora Assyrian representatives
petitioned in Paris and Geneva in favour of an autonomous Assyrian homeland,27 male
Assyrians were organized in police mobile units to oversee the Turkish–Iraqi provisional
frontier border and curb any Kurdish tribal insurgencies.28
Yet the British presence in the region was far from being unchallenged. By March 1919,
several letters originating from Jazira Ibn Umar were funnelled to the border area urging
the expulsion of ‘foreigners’ (British) and asked for local tribes to support the Ottoman
government. The actual instruments of Turkish propaganda were the Goyan, a Kurdish
tribe situated for the most part just outside the British administrative area, to the north of
Zakho. In return, the British established an intelligence centre around Zakho to collect
information about the ‘enemy’ and send pro-British agents to spread propaganda within
the Turkish territory.29 An unofﬁcial war at the frontier gradually got underway.30
Between 1919 and 1921 British authorities reported anti-Christian massacres in the
Goyan country because the local Nestorians and Assyrian Levies came to be seen as the
allies of ‘foreign-inﬁdels’.31 Encouraged by Turkish agents in the area, the Christian villages
of the Amadiyah district were systematically raided by Kurdish groups. Even though the
loss of life was small, crops and sheep were subject to theft and destruction. In return,
British aeroplanes bombed the rebellious tribes, including unarmed inhabitants of the vil-
lages and towns.32 Despite the end of anti-Christian attacks by early 1922, British authorities
considered that frequent air raids against transborder tribes were a necessary policy to
obtain a ‘marked effect’33 amid Kurds – that is, to hamper ‘any attempt on the part of the
Turks to open direct communication’ between Rawanduz and Jazirah bin Umar, the latter
being considered by the British as a hub for Turkish propaganda in Eastern Anatolia.34
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Discourses on Muslim solidarity and self-determination
As in other parts of the former Ottoman Empire, several activists and local chiefs who 
embodied a greater ideological heterogeneity ‘were engaged in similar forms of rebellious 
activities that had a common anti-imperialist motivation’.35 The similarities between 
diverse anticolonial insurgencies were hardly surprising. Although these movements have 
been studied separately, as a reﬂection of the nation-centred historiographies of the 
Ottoman successor states – the Turkish War of Independence, the Iraqi revolt of 1920, the 
Great Syrian revolt and so forth – one should not forget that many insurgents had been 
Ottoman subjects, and that many of them were mobilized into the Ottoman army 
between 1914 and 1918. As Michael Provence has observed ‘abundant evidence […] sug-
gests that rebel participants – collective veterans of wars to save the Ottoman State – did 
not view the post-Ottoman revolts as separate movements of national liberation but 
rather as locally conditioned elements of a single, undifferentiated struggle’.36
While the inﬂuence of a ‘Young Turk’ intellectual heritage was evident after the First 
World War (especially among ofﬁcers trained in military schools) as the Ottoman Empire 
entered into a phase of disintegration, local players framed anti-imperialist activities in dif-
ferent and sometimes contradicting ways, borrowing ideas and discourses from diverse 
sources and cultural idioms.
The ﬁrst source of local unrest was Turkish propaganda. The leaders of the Turkish War 
of Independence led by Mustafa Kemal rallied several Kurdish chiefs and urban notables 
to the battle against the English ‘foreign-inﬁdels’, using intense propaganda based on the 
idea of ‘Ottoman-Muslim solidarity’.37 According to British records, by early 1919 a net-
work of ‘Young Turk’ activists established local groups under the title of ‘Committees for 
Turco-Kurdish Independence’ in towns such as Urfa, Mardin, Diyarbakir and Jazira bin 
Umar.38 The objective of these activities was to keep the sources of rebellion alive hoping 
to regain the ancient Ottoman Vilayet of Mosul, considered a territory historically linked 
to Anatolia.39 The invocation of Islam and a shared Ottoman past presented not only a sys-
tem of powerful political and cultural symbols, but also constituted a legitimate discourse 
that could be readily recognized and understood by all.
Among Turkish propagandists in the region, Commander €Ozdemir Pasha (Ali Shaﬁq, 
born in Cairo in 1885)40 had a signiﬁcant success in Rawanduz area following his arrival in 
March 1922.41 Although his chief weapon was propaganda, the war of words was backed 
up by concentrations of troops in the frontier area, trade embargoes and frontier block-
ades. In addition, arms were also distributed among the tribes, whilst on the north-eastern 
frontier pro-Turkish c¸etes (armed irregulars) occupied the disaffected area and used it as a 
base for further incitement to revolt.
Propaganda around Muslim solidarity was welcomed not only by unruly mountainous 
tribes, but also by the notables further south. According to a number of Turkish letters 
found in Sulaimaniya, the vali of Van, Qadri Effendi was in constant contact with the chiefs 
of the Hamawand, Hawraman, Mariwan and Jaf, as well as notables in Arbil and Kirkuk.42 In 
the memoirs written by Raﬁq Hilmi, Sheikh Mahmud’s secretary in 1919, it appears that 
after the revolt led by the Goyan tribe, Sheikh Mahmud sealed an agreement with €Ozdemir 
and expelled all British collaborators from Sulaimaniya in the name of the ‘Kurdish–Turkish 
friendship’ on the grounds of a shared Muslim bond, a collusion that lasted several years 
thereby allowing the Turks to press the British until the resolution of the Mosul Affair.43
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The Muslim tone was also present in documents and letters exchanged between local
actors. Tribal chiefs such as Mahmud Khan Dizli (Hawraman) wrote a series of letters to
Kurdish leaders intermingling religious and patriotic terms. In one instance Mahmud Khan
Dizli refers to Sheikh Mahmud as ‘Jihad Sheikh Mahmud’ who ‘for the honour of our reli-
gion turned the English out of Sulaimaniya and Halabja and from among the Kurds’.44
More tellingly, Sheikh Mahmud himself sent a despatch to the Arab commander of the
‘National Movements in Al Jazirah and Iraq’ in which he stated that he had exposed him-
self to suffering and danger in order to ‘frustrate the evil intentions of the British against
the Islamic world and to upset the effects of their policy which is to sever the people of
South Kurdistan (either by threats or persuasion) from the Great Government of Turkey’.45
However, Turkish propaganda based on ‘Muslim solidarity’ was not the only discourse
that mattered among local leaders and tribes. The right to self-determination, as coined
by Thomas Woodrow Wilson prior to the Paris Peace Conference, and thus the prospect
of a Kurdish state as per British projects in the region, was also appealing to many. In that
regard, Raﬁq Hilmi’s memoirs are again essential to grasp the complexities of attitudes
and perceptions of local players in the Mosul vilayet. Hilmi explains, for instance, that
Sheikh Mahmud asked him to write a petition and a special letter which were sent to
Sharef Pasha, the representative of the Kurdish delegation at the Peace Conference in
Paris in 1919. However, the group entrusted with conveying the petition failed to reach
Paris so Sharef Pasha never received it.46 Despite this failure and his collusion with the
Turks, Sheikh Mahmud encouraged the spread of Kurdish nationalism in Southern Kurdi-
stan in different ways.
Indeed, since 1918 Kurdish nationalism had become the new source of Sheikh
Mahmud’s legitimacy, particularly as he engaged with the British authorities. He sur-
rounded himself with the local intelligentsia, which included civil servants, teachers, jour-
nalists and ex-ofﬁcers of the Ottoman army.47 The ﬁrst government of Sheikh Mahmud
equipped itself with a Kurdish ‘national’ ﬂag48 and, although British reports insist on the
importance of tribal elements, the representatives of the urban intelligentsia played an
unquestionable part in the autonomous Kurdish administration.
Such manoeuvres by the Sheikh prompted a British response. By 1919, Major Edward
W.C. Noel – the Acting Civil Commissioner – decided to put an end to Mahmud’s govern-
ment because the Kurdish chief was trying to extend his control over Kirkuk and Kifri –
actions which threatened to break the balance of power in the north of Iraq and bring the
other Kurdish chiefs with him to take part in a widespread rebellion against the British.
Sulaimaniya did not, however, experience the stability that the British military authori-
ties had hoped for. Fearing the advance of rebellious Kurdish tribes and Turkish c¸etes, the
British decided to evacuate the town in a hurry on 1 September 1922. The High Commis-
sioner then decided to bring Sheikh Mahmud back and to appoint him the governor of
Kurdistan on 10 October 1922. A month later, Sheikh Mahmud proclaimed himself the
‘King of Kurdistan’ and initiated the publication of the newspaper Roj^ı Kurdistan (Kurdistan
Sun) with the collaboration of Sulaimaniya’s leading intellectuals and poets. He again
encouraged nationalist symbolism: the reinstatement of the Kurdish ﬂag, the printing of
‘Kurdish’ postal stamps and the organization of military parades which contributed to the
diffusion of nationalism as the lingua franca of Sulaimaniya residents. In July 1922, a group
of Sulaimaniya intellectuals and notables led by Mustafa Pasha (1866–1936) followed the
footsteps of Sheikh Mahmud, and founded Jamiyeti Kurdistan (The Kurdistan Association),
7
and two months later they published the ﬁrst issue of Bang^ı Kurdistan (The Call of
Kurdistan), the Association’s ofﬁcial journal. These journals were key instruments in dis-
seminating Kurdish nationalism supported by ‘universal’ aspirations. Thus, for instance, in
January 1923 Roj^ı Kurdistan published diverse articles where the public was reminded of
the Wilsonian principles:
No one in this country or among the Kurds desires to be under foreign rule, no one has any
desire other than to live as a free and independent nation. This is the era of nationalism and
every people is looking for its independence and liberty.49
In the same journal, it is stated that because patriotism among Kurds was widespread and
the latter were key actors in the unlocking of the ‘Mosul Affair’, the Kurds should be
allowed to send their own representatives to the Peace Conference in Lausanne.50 Not-
withstanding this demand, the potential establishment of a Kurdistan state did not rule
out other political alternatives such as the confederal framework; that is, reuniting the
autonomous Kurdish entity again with ‘the Islamic Government [Turkey]’.51
Sheikh Mahmud and the publications he sponsored in Sulaimaniya were not the only
local voices that harboured different discourses and engaged in contradicting alliances.
Ismail Simko Agha, the Chief of the Shikak (a Kurdish tribe living in the borderlands of the
former Ottoman-Iranian frontier) sought to establish solid relations with the Turks to push
‘foreigners’ out of the region.52 His willingness to work with Turkey did not mean that he
shunned the British, particularly if the latter supported the establishment of an autono-
mous Kurdish entity.53 Like Sheikh Mahmud, Simko encouraged the spread of Kurdish
nationalism in north-western Persia by backing cultural activities such as establishing the
ﬁrst Kurdish school in addition to the publication of the ﬁrst Kurdish–Persian language
newspaper. Yet, while the prospect of establishing an independent Kurdistan was cher-
ished by Agha Simko at different times, the survival of his ﬁefdom surrounded by new
and old ‘enemies’ seemed to be his only roadmap.54
Thus, in the post-Ottoman Vilayet of Mosul, the nationalist ﬁeld included a collection of
activists, organizations and constituencies that expressed their political aspirations
through discourses that were as disparate as they were themselves. It was especially con-
fusing that different nationalist discourses, coloured with different ideological tones –
Muslim solidarity, Wilsonian principles, Kurdish–Muslim nationalism – were displayed by
the same actors. As Erez Manela puts it, the ‘Wilsonian moment’ (1919–1920) allowed
anti-colonial movements to search for new allies, languages and methods to help their
quest to challenge imperialism. In addition, Wilson’s rhetoric of self-determination in the
colonial world was not deﬁned by the intention of its author, but by the perceptions, goals
and contexts of its often-unintended audiences.55 As new ‘national identities’ – Turkish,
Kurdish, Arab – were not yet ﬁxed, the ‘cultural system’ of nationalism could be the vehicle
for different and shifting aspirations, open to disparate inﬂuences. The shifting context
along with the ﬂuid character of ‘national identities’ in the early 1920s was thus reﬂected
in the diversity of political discourses advanced by borderlanders.
However, borderlanders’ discourses did not merely play into Turkish and British strate-
gies. Actually, as local actors interplayed with the latter, it appeared that Turkish and
British discourses were neither completely independent from others’ – enemies and bor-
derlanders – categories and strategies nor unchangeable. On the one hand, pro-Turkish
Muslim rhetoric among tribal areas was not simply a top-down strategy. According to
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intercepted messages, Kurdish tribal chieftains asked the Kemalist resistance for a decree 
issued by the Caliph himself in order to join the rebel forces.56 On the other hand, while 
‘Ottoman solidarity’ and the ‘defence of Islam’ became the main expressions of resistance 
against the ‘foreign occupiers’ from 1919 to 1921, this language shifted to that of national-
ism and minority rights during the Lausanne Peace Conference.
Consequently, Britain and Turkey were obliged to adapt their claims over Mosul by tak-
ing into account this new reality. From the Turkish point of view, Turkish–Kurdish unity 
was emphasized both at the Grand National assembly and in Lausanne. In the border 
area, €Ozdemir Pasha acknowledged Sheikh Mahmud’s position as the ‘President of the 
Committee of Representatives of Kurdistan’, and by 1922 Turkish propaganda tended to 
encourage the belief that the Kemalists, unlike the British, were ready to give full auton-
omy to the Kurds under the protection of a ‘Muslim Government’.57
As a response, Britain issued a joint Anglo-Iraqi statement of intent in the same year in 
which the mandatory power and the government of Iraq recognized the right of the Kurds 
living within the boundaries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish government. In addition, by late 
1922, C.J. Edmonds, a political ofﬁcer, elaborated a memorandum in which concrete 
measures – including ﬁscal arrangements – were advanced to satisfy Kurdish aspirations 
for autonomy ‘under British protection’. Although the plan was not fully implemented, 
local unrest at the provisional Turkish–Iraqi frontier obliged the British to hint at political 
moves to meet Kurdish claims.58
Such half-promises did not preclude a mistrustful relationship between all the players 
concerned. British records abound in reports and letters in which the mandatory powers 
clearly state that Sheikh Mahmud was not trustworthy because of his ‘treachery’. The 
same is true on the Turkish side. A series of letters intercepted by the Persian authorities 
reveal that €Ozdemir Pasha suspected Sheikh Mahmud of being a tool of the British and 
depicted him as a ‘cunning man’. Likewise, Ismail Agha Simko, who had been cooperating 
with Sheikh Mahmud and the Turks against the British, described him as a ‘scoundrel’.59
Interestingly, as Fuat D€undar shows, while the British and the Turks had been cynically 
exploiting both the statistical data and the principle of self-determination between 1922 
and 1924 to support their discrepant claims over Mosul vilayet and obtain an advanta-
geous settlement of the Turkish–Iraqi border, the February 1925 Kurdish rebellion in Tur-
key led by Sheikh Said60 had an impact on their discourse as well.61 The repression of the 
rebel movement – notably the execution of a number of Kurdish personalities, the forced 
displacement of thousands of Kurds62 – seemed to cast doubt upon ‘Kurdish–Turkish 
brotherhood’ in the eyes of the Commission. Accordingly, the Turkish government shifted 
its strategy before the League of Nations emphasizing the predominantly ‘Sunni’ character 
of the Mosul population, which better related the latter to Turkey. Critically, the signiﬁcant 
Shia constituency in southern Iraq made the attachment of Mosul vilayet to Turkey all the 
more urgent.63
Silencing borderlanders’ voices
The internationalization of the ‘Mosul affair’ provided borderlanders with a new opportu-
nity to jump forward and attempt to voice their concerns. Although their views were not 
explicitly included in the ﬁnal decision taken by the League in December 1925, their 
actions and statements had an indirect effect in the deﬁnitive resolution of the dispute.
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The Council of the League of Nations discussed the matter on 30 August 1924. Contrary
to British expectations, however, it decided to send a commission made up of three dele-
gates to the Mosul Vilayet to determine whether the locals wanted to be part of the new
Republic of Turkey or preferred British mandatory Iraq. At a meeting in Brussels, Swedish
prime minister and rapporteur of the Commission, Hjalmar Branting, suggested that a
temporary demarcation line be drawn somewhere between the British and Turkish lines,
taking into consideration natural formations, such as mountain crests and rivers. Two
months later, the Council accepted Branting’s demarcation line paving the way for the ini-
tial works of the Commission.64
As Sarah Shields points out, from the very beginning Britain perceived the presence of
the Commission as a potential threat to their continuing authority over Mosul. In that
sense, British ‘support’ for the League project was not a proof of self-conﬁdence, but
rather a strategy to ‘minimize the possible threats to its own rule’.65 The mandate authori-
ties even went so far as to try to restrict the movement of the representatives assigned by
Ankara to accompany the Commission.66 As a result, the Commissioners refused to begin
their work until the British and Iraqi authorities allowed all representatives, including the
Turkish delegation, to accomplish their mission. The autonomy of the Commission from
British interests became even more explicit as the Swedish delegate carried out ‘an active
foreign policy based on solidarity with and support of the League of Nations’ thereby cre-
ating additional worries amid the mandate’s ofﬁcials.67
The League’s initiative and its potential destabilizing effect in the northern districts of
Iraq had an immediate indirect impact on the mandatory power. Thus, before the arrival
of the Commission in February 1925, ‘the Iraqi Minister of Interior Affairs toured Mosul
vilayet and promised that the Kurds’ national rights would be respected if they decided to
stay within Iraq’.68 A British-sponsored meeting in Arbil along the same lines followed suit,
while pro-Iraqi ‘spies and propagandists’ were sent into Turkey to fuel unrest.69
Despite these moves, the mandate authorities were unable to completely silence
opposing voices. Pro-Turkey secret societies, made up of mainly Turkmen, in the cities of
Arbil and Kirkuk proved to be especially active.70 Likewise some Kurdish notables such as
Haji Abdul Latif from Amadiyah met the Commission to whom he declared his pro-Turkish
sentiment, claiming that ‘all the Kurds wanted the Turks’.71
However, borderlanders’ agency unleashed state reaction on both sides of the provi-
sional frontier. On the one hand, border leaders who had manifested their loyalty to
Turkey were either killed, imprisoned or banished, and even some villages located in the
border area were bombed and burned by the Assyrian Levies.72 Signiﬁcantly, the coercive
campaign reached such intense levels that some border tribes situated on the Iraqi side
threatened to migrate to Turkey if the reprisal campaign did not stop immediately.73
On the other hand, the Turkish authorities threatened Kurdish chieftains whose lands
were in the border region in a similar manner: ‘Tell the Commission we are Muslims and
we live together with the Muslim Turks […] If you support the Iraqi government you will
become an ally with the Arabs and the unbelievers. Regret will be no use’.74 Turkish
threats were also geared towards the Iraqi elites at large as placards appeared throughout
the region in which Ankara conveyed the idea that the Turkish army would not attack the
British but the Iraqi state representatives, should Mosul remain in Iraq.75
Further, in June a regiment of Turkish soldiers took vengeance on the Assyrians and
Kurds in the Goyan district because they had testiﬁed to the Frontier Commission their
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desire to be included in Iraq. According to different accounts, over 2000 Assyrian refugees
ﬂed to Zakho and Mosul. All their ﬂocks and stocks of grain were conﬁscated by the
Turkish troops, who stated that they were preparing for war and that the Christians could
return after the conclusion of hostilities.76
The massacres against Assyrians had certain repercussions in Western public opin-
ion and the secretariat of the League of Nations, as the events were revealed to the
press by an American journalist working for the Chicago Tribune, who happened to
be in the region reporting on the works of the League’s commission in Mosul
vilayet.77 Yet local actors such as Mgr. Thimothee Magdaci, the Bishop of Zakho and
Dohuk, also played a role in drawing the attention of the League towards the fate of
this community. While the news of the massacres were already circulating by June
1925, it was only when the League’s commission intended to tour the border areas
that the Iraqi government and the Mandate authorities gave some resonance to Mag-
daci’s claims.
Subsequently, the British government made a formal complaint and requested the
Council of the League of Nations to send representatives to the locality of the frontier.
The commission arrived at Mosul on 30 October 1925, and proceeded to take evidence
regarding the complaint of the Turkish government that British aircraft had crossed the
Brussels Line, and the deportation of Christians. The ﬁnal report found the British charges
substantiated, and stated that Turkish soldiers occupied all the villages and carried out
deportation en masse, during which Assyrians fell ill and were abandoned, while others
died of starvation and cold.78
Finally, local tribes also tried to voice their uneasy position when asked about their
‘national’ preference. Conﬁdential British reports reveal that borderlanders pledged before
the Commission for an ‘open border solution’ which would guarantee them free mobility
across the Turkish–Iraqi frontier in order to access their summer grazing lands situated in
Turkish territory.79 Against this background, British authorities encouraged Kurdish nota-
bles to write petitions supporting British claims, whereby they argued that Mosul vilayet
was economically connected to Baghdad rather than to Anatolia and that only a ‘natural’
boundary delimited by the mountainous region running from Zakho to Rawanduz would
secure Iraqi safety and progress.80
The impact of borderlanders’ views on the border regime as envisioned by the Frontier
Commission and the League of Nations cannot be over-stated. Yet, it is interesting to
highlight that while Turkey and Britain stated that Mosul vilayet was economically ori-
ented to Anatolia and Baghdad, respectively, the way of life of local tribes ﬁtted better
with the liberal approach the League was eager to develop in the interwar period. In
1924, for instance, the League had already acknowledged that:
if the disputed territory is assigned to Iraq, its inhabitants should be given full freedom of
trade with Turkey and Syria, and moreover, facilities should be afforded to the Turkish frontier
towns to use the Mosul route for exporting their produce and importing manufactured
articles.81
Although both Britain and Turkey insisted on the disruptive impact of drawing the new
Turkish–Iraqi border in the wrong place, the League seemed to agree with borderlanders
in that whoever got Mosul and wherever the borders were drawn, ‘the resulting interrup-
tions as in other border areas of the world were more than manageable’.82
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Conclusion
Within the context characterized by extreme ﬂuidity and indeterminacy on the frontier 
areas of the Mosul province, borderlanders heralded different, and sometimes contradic-
tory, political discourses that ranged from Ottoman-Muslim solidarity to Kurdish national-
ism. The same actors also contributed to transborder networks of violence and exchange 
throughout the Mosul dispute. Like other Ottoman communities, Mosul’s populations 
simultaneously had multiple group identities, and could be classiﬁed according to loca-
tion, faith, clan or occupation. Unsurprisingly, as the League of Nations delegates arrived 
in the province of Mosul in 1925, local populations once more provided a complex and 
nuanced response to the Commission’s survey.
Arguably, the political preference of the people of Mosul could only be conditional 
upon a variety of criteria, such as the identity of the ruler, the potential economic impact 
or the survival of previous social networks. Far from being a signal of their incapacity to 
adapt to the new world order, this article has sought to prove that such attitudes and posi-
tions were a striking example of the capacity of local agency; that is, the capacity of local 
populations to develop strategies to pursue or safeguard their own interests.
Local agency does not mean complete empowerment, or guaranteed success. Ironi-
cally, while local revolts, transborder mobility and shifting alliances with Turkish and 
British representatives had allowed local players between 1918 and 1924 to gain auton-
omy from all state actors and extend their spheres of inﬂuence, it was at least partly bor-
derlanders’ agency that led Turkey and Great Britain as well as the League of Nations to 
search for a permanent solution based on the principle of territorial sovereignty within a 
modern international system of ‘nation-states’.
In 1926 a standing Frontier Commission was set up. While at ﬁrst Turkey seemed to be 
reluctant to participate in the work of the Commission, frequent frontier infringements 
and constant border transgressions of borderlanders and trespassers forced the Turkish 
authorities to monitor the Turco-Iraqi border more intensively once the Mosul dispute 
was settled. In doing so, local actors inadvertently contributed to the emergence of the 
Turkish–Iraqi border as a social institution and helped to slowly transform these border-
lands into bordered lands.
Epistemologically, a history of the Frontier dispute that pays attention to how border-
landers played off state powers and developed transborder networks of violence and 
exchange allows us both to combine diplomatic, local and transnational approaches, and 
to highlight the contradictory aspects of borderlanders’ behaviour. Likewise, such an 
approach invites historians to elaborate ‘less linear stories that leave room for the surpris-
ing and the puzzling’.83
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